Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 49

Issue 4

Article 4

Fall 9-1-1992

World Trade Rules And Environmental Policies: Congruence Or
Conflict?
John H. Jackson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the International Trade
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules And Environmental Policies: Congruence Or Conflict?, 49
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1227 (1992).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol49/iss4/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

WORLD TRADE RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES: CONGRUENCE OR CONFLICT?
JOHN H. JACKSON*

TABLE oF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................

I.

OBJECTIVES OF TRADE RULES AND RELATION TO ENVIRON-

II.

MENTAL POLICY ..........................................................
NATIONAL TREATMENT AND PRODUCT STANDARDS .............

III.

CONSERVATION ............................................................
THE PROCESS-PRODUCT PROBLEM: TUNA DOLPHIN CASE &

V.

THE GLOBAL COMMONS QUESTIONS .................................
SuBsmi s ..................................................................
......................
EXPORTS & COMPETITIVENESS ........

VI.

VIII.

1230
1235

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS IN ARTICLE XX: HEALTH &

IV.

VII.

1227

THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, TRANSPARENCY, AND JURISPRUDENCE ......................................

SoME CONCLUSIONS ............... ......................................

1239
1242
1245
1248
1250
1255

ANNEXES:
ANNEX A: SELECTED PROVISIONS OF GATT (ARTS.

I, I1,

VI, XI, XVI, XX) ..... :................................................
ANNEX B: JOHN H. JACKSON MEMO, "CHANGING GATT
RULES" (NOVEMBER 7, 1991) .........................................

1260
1268

ANNEX C: SELECTED TEXT FROM NORTH AMERICAN FREE

TRADE8AGREEMENT (OCTOBER 7, 1992) ...........................

1275

INTRODUCTION'

Proposition 1: Protection of the environment has become exceedingly
important, and promises to be more important for the benefit of future
generations. Protecting the environment involves rules of international co-

* Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. In connection with the subject of this paper, readers may want to examine the
following other works by this same author. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT
SYSTEM (1990) [hereinafter JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT]; JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND GATT (1969) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND GATT]; JoHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTEmRATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989)
[hereinafter JACKSON, WoRLD TRADING SYSTEM]; JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1986); JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC RULES (1984) [hereinafter JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND].
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operation, sanction, or both, so that some government actions to enhance
environmental protection will not be undermined by the actions of other
governments. Sometimes such rules involve trade restricting measures.
Proposition 2: Trade liberalization is important for enhancing world
economic welfare and for providing a greater opportunity for billions of
individuals to lead satisfying lives. Measures that restrict trade often will
decrease the achievement of this goal.
These two propositions state the opposing policy objectives that currently
pose important and difficult dilemmas for governments. This type of "policy
discord" is not unique; there are many similar policy discords, at both the
national and the international levels, that governments must confront. 2
Indeed, there is some evidence that environmental policy and trade policy
are complementary, at least in the sense that increasing world welfare can
lead to citizen demands and governmental actions to improve protection for
the environment. The poorest nations in the world cannot afford such
protection, but as welfare increases protection becomes more affordable.3
An unfortunate development in public and interest group attention to
trade and the environment is the appearance of hostility between proponents
of the two different propositions stated above. The hostility is misplaced
because both groups will need the assistance and cooperation of the other
group in order to accomplish their respective policy objectives. Of course,
some of this tension is typical of political systems. Political participants
often seek to achieve opposing objectives and goals. Each side may endorse
legitimate goals, but when the goals clash, accommodation is necessary.
To some extent, the conflicts between the trade liberalization proponents
and the environmental protection proponents derive from a certain "difference in cultures" between the trade policy experts and the environmental
policy experts. Oddly enough, even when operating within the framework
of the same society, these different "policy cultures" have developed different attitudes and perceptions of the political and, policy processes, and
these different outlooks create misunderstandings and conflict between the
groups .4

These problems are part of a broader trend of international economic
relations that is posing a number of perplexing and troublesome situations
for statesmen and policy leaders. Part of the difficulty inevitably results
from the growth of international economic interdependence.' Such interde2. An example of policy discord is the conflicting goals of providing adequate medical
coverage while minimizing budget expenditures.
3. Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, EnvironmentalImpacts of a North American
Free Trade Agreement, 158 DiscussioN PAPERS EcoN. (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton, N.J.), Nov. 1991.
4. The "culture of difference" is well described in Robert W. Jerome, Traders and
Environmentalists, J. COM., Dec. 27, 1991, at 4A.
5. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note I, at 2; John H. Jackson,
TransnationalEnterprises & International Codes of Conduct: Introductory Remarks for Experts, Address Before International Bar Association Meeting in Berlin (Aug. 27, 1980), in Law
QuadrangleNotes 19, 19-24.
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pendence increases trade in both products and services across national
borders and brings many benefits to participating countries. International
interdependence also results in efficiencies and economies of scale that can
raise world welfare (but not necessarily everyone's welfare, because some
6
groups will be required to adjust in the face of increased competition).
This trend towards increased international economic interdependence requires a different sort of attitude towards government regulation. Within a
nation, government regulations in such areas as consumer protection, competition policy, prudential measures (of banking and financial institutions),
health and welfare (for example, alcohol and abortion control), and human
rights (for example, prohibiting discrimination), are all designed by governments to promote worthy policies that sometimes clash with market oriented
economic policies. When economic interdependence moves a number of
these issues to the international scene, they become (at least in today's
defective international system) much more difficult to manage. The circumstances and the broader scope of the international system create in many
contexts (not just those concerning environmental policies) a series of
problems and questions including:
General questions of effectiveness of national "sovereignty" in
the face of a need to cooperate with other countries to avoid some
aspects of the "prisoners dilemma ' 7 or "free rider" 8 problems.
Unless there is, cooperation, individual countries can profit from
the efforts of other countries without contributing to those efforts,
but in the loriger run all may suffer;
Perplexing questions of how new international rules should be
made, questions that often involve voting procedures;
General questions of the appropriateness and degree to which
national" sovereignty will submit to international dispute settlement
procedures to resolve differences on various policy matters;
Problems of a single national sovereign using the extraterritorial
-

6. See, e.g., PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 167-92 (1985).
7. "Prisoners dilemma" refers to the hypothetical economic paradigm where two persons
have partially opposing goals and might achieve a better result from cooperation than
competition. The example often used is two prisoners being interrogated separately by a police
official who is offering each one some advantage in return for confessing to a joint crime, or
for giving information about the other's involvement in the crime. If the two cooperate and
refuse to give any information, it is suggested that they may be in a better situation than if
each tells on the other. In economic terms, countries, firms, or individuals could pursue
competitive policies which, when pursued by everyone, cause aggregate damage to all (for
example, competitive subsidization). The question then arises what would be the case if they
cooperate so as to prevent the incentive to compete against each other with damaging policies.
8. "Free rider" refers to the situation where a group of countries agree to some
discipline such as a restraint on using certain trade barriers. Under Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) they may be required to give the advantages of that discipline to other countries
including countries that have not entered the specific agreement. Consequently, those countries
that have not joined the agreement enjoy a benefit without submitting themselves to the
discipline and are "free riders."
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reach of its regulation (sometimes termed unilateralism) to impose
its will on the actions of other nations, or the citizens of other
nations;
Significant legitimate differences of view'between nations as to
economic structure, level of economic development, forms of government, appropriate role of government in economic activities, etc.
Developing countries, for example, will have different views than
on many "trade-off" matters, with developing countries generally
arguing that environmental regulations unfairly restrain their econoutic development. They note that rich countries have benefitted
from decades or centuries of freedom from environmental protection
rules, and that even today the rich countries are responsible for
most of the world's pollution. Furthermore, poor countries argue
that the imposition of environmental regulations threatens their
economies with stagnation and populations with starvation.
All these circumstances and arguments occur in the context of a relatively
chaotic and unstructured international system, which in many ways has not
evolved adequately to keep up with the implications of growing international
economic interdependence. This paper will probe the more specific issues
of the relationship of international trade policy rules to environmental
policies and rules, 9 primarily in the context of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)I ° (which is the most important set of international
trade policy rules). This will be done in the eight parts. Part I surveys the
policies and certain rules of the GATT system and is followed by five parts
that discuss areas of conflict between GATT policies and environmental
policies. Part VII discusses institutional and dispute settlement issues and
Part VIII draws conclusions about the relationship between trade policies
and environmental policies.
The term "environmental policies" is defined very broadly for purposes
of this paper. It includes, for example, measures relating to health or health
risks. The phrases "trade policies" and "trade liberalization" also are
defined broadly to include not only trade in goods, but also trade in
services.
I.

OBJECTIVES OF TRADE RuLEs AND RELATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY
The most significant and widespread rule system for international trade
is the GATT system, which includes the GATT and over 200 ancillary

9. The literature and documents discussing environmental policy are so voluminous and
numerous that it is pointless to cite very much. Obviously the drafts for "Agenda 21" for the
Rio June 1992 conference are an important expression of environmental policies, as are the
27 "Principles" set forth in a document for "Agenda item 9." The rather high generality of
these expressions leave many questions open for further analytical works on detail.
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT].
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treaties, as well as a number of other related arrangements and decisions.
The GATT may soon be modified by the Uruguay Round," so this paper
will refer to the GATT/MTO system as broadly embracing the system as it
is now and as it may emerge within a year or two. Of course, a number
of other treaties or arrangements, such as regional blocs like the proposed
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 12 are relevant to this
discussion of "trade-environment policy discord," but most of the essential
principles of the discord can be discussed in the context of GATT. Consequently, this paper will focus on the GATT/MTO rules and policies as
worthy generic examples of problems that also occur in other contexts.
. The basic policy underlying the GATT (and the broader "Bretton Woods
System" established in 1944-1948) is well known. 3 The objective is to
liberalize trade that crosses national, boundaries, and to pursue the benefits
described in economic theory as "comparative advantage." The notion of
comparative advantage relates partly to the theories of economies of scale.
When nations specialize, they become more efficient in producing a product
(and possibly also a service). If they can trade their products or services
for the different products or services that other countries specialize in
producing, then all parties involved will be better off because countries will
not waste resources producing products that other countries can produce
more efficiently. The international rules are designed to restrain governmental interference with this type of trade.
There are exceptions to the general policy of liberalizing trade, one of
which arises from the problem of "externalities," a concept that is closely
associated with environmental protection. If a producer pollutes a stream
during its manufacturing process, and there are no laws prohibiting such
pollution, then it has imposed an "externality cost" on the world. The
externality cost is the difference between the values of the unpolluted stream
and the polluted stream. Because there is no law against polluting the
stream, the cost is not recouped from the producer or passed on to the
consumers of the product. This concept appears to be one of the most
important core dilemmas or policy problems of the relationship between
trade and environmental policies. Thus, much of the relationship is concerned with how environmental protection costs can be "internalized," to
follow what is sometimes termed the "polluter pays principle."
The problem often boils down to the need to provide certain kinds of
governmental rules or incentives that in certain ways either clash with the

11. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Dunkel Draft]. An
Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO) is proposed in a Draft
Charter in the Dunkel Draft, Annex IV. See Dunkel Draft, supra, at 91-101.
12. North America Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., available in
LEXIS, GENFED-EXTRA Database; WL, NAFTA Database (awaiting ratification as this

article went to press).
13. See JACKSON,
supra note I.

SYSTEM,

WORLD TRADE AND

GATT, supra note I;

JACKSON, WORLD TRADING
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basic trade liberalization rules, or that alter them significantly. As soon as
this occurs, however, there is a risk of undermining the GATT liberalization
policies and rules. It is this "policy discord" that raises the difficult question
of how to accommodate the competing values of trade liberalization on the
one hand, and environmental protection on the other hand, without undermining the basic principles of both policy sets.
The GATT trade liberalization policies that have been deemed fundamental for almost one-half of a century include:
Tariff reduction: Originally the basic goal of the GATT was
to reduce tariffs. In this respect the GATT has been most successful
(particularly with respect to tariffs on industrial products imported
into industrial nations).' 4 Indeed, in the last several years this goal
has had a profound influence on a number of countries that are
not industrialized.' 5 (GATT Article II).
National treatment: The national treatment rule requires that
nations, when applying their domestic taxes and regulations, treat
imports no less favorably than they treat their domestically produced
goods (and services). (GATT Article III).
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN): Nations are required to treat
other nation participants in the system (GATT members) equally
with respect to imports (or exports). Thus, under the GATT rules
a nation cannot discriminate (with some exceptions) between bicycle
imports from Japan and bicycle imports from Italy. (Article I).
Non-Tariff Barriers: As the decades of GATT history passed,
it became increasingly clear that tariffs were no longer the major
problem of trade barriers. Instead, so-called "non-tariff barriers
(NTBs)" became much more important, and were addressed systematically for the first time in the Tokyo Round of the 1970s which
produced a series of "codes" (special side treaties or agreements)
that attempted to address some of the key NTB issues.' 6 In the
current Uruguay Round Negotiation, this process is being extended
even further, and of course new issues involving intellectual property
and trade in services are being added (with considerable complexity).' 7 NTBs are very numerous, and new trade restriction and
8
distortion techniques are constantly arising.'
Arguably the current GATT system is not capable of handling the trade
liberalization problems of the forthcoming decades, and improvement will
be necessary. One major emerging problem is the effect of. differences in
economic structures and cultures. Issues formerly thought to be well within

14.

JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,

supra note 1, at 115-31.

15. See, e.g., Richard E. Feinberg, Latin America: Back on the Screen, INT'L ECON.
INSIGHTS,

16.

July-Aug. 1992, at 2, 2-6.
JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND,

supra note 1.

17. Dunkel Draft, supra note 11.
18. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 130.
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the exclusive terrain of national sovereignties, such as exchange rates and
taxing policies, now must be examined for their impact on trade liberalization or barriers.
The GATT has established a new program to systematically look at
governmental trade policies, called the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(TPRM).' 9 In addition, the United States and Japan have bilaterally entered
into a discussion process called Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) 20 that
has probed very deeply into the two different societies and the systemic
problems that affect trade flows between them. (SII could very well be
generalized gradually to include other groups of countries, and ultimately
become part of the GATT TPRM). These procedures are part of a trend
for the future, and while environmental discussions could become a part of
these procedures, further evolution will be needed.
Several recent important studies have tried to inventory some of the
particular GATT system rules and clauses that have implications for environmental policy. Rather than repeat those inventories here, I refer to them
in the footnotes, 2' and include some text in an Annex.2 Needless to say,
this area is very complex and important work needs to be done on understanding the particular relationship between a number of the GATT/MTO
system rules on the one hand, and the environmental policies on the other
hand.
A few "hypothetical" cases will demonstrate some of the possible policy
clashes. In the cases below I use the initials "ENV" to indicate the
environmentally "correct" country that imports (or exports), and the initials
"EXP" to indicate the exporting country, and "IMP" to indicate an
importing country.
- ENV establishes a rule that requires a special deposit or tax on
packaging which is not biodegradable, arguing that such packages
are a danger for the environment. It so happens that ENV producers
use a different package that is not so taxed. Only the packages
from EXP are effected. (In some cases it can be established that
the tax imposed is in excess of that needed for the environmental
protection.)
- ENV establishes a rule that requires any business firm which
sells a product in the ENV market to establish a center that will

19. See GATT Doc. Series C/RM/..

.,

and recent reports such as GATT Doc. C/RM/

S/26A&B (June 12, 1992) (regarding Uruguay) and GATT Doc. C/RM/S/23A&B (Nov. 7,
1991) (regarding United States).
20. Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example of Bilateral
Trade Negotiations, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 436 (1991).
21. GENEa. AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90-91, at 1939 (1992) [hereinafter GATT REPORT 90-91]; U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND OPPORrUNrEs (1992) [hereinafter OTA
REPORT]; Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable
Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & ComP. L. REV. 535 (1992).
22. See Annex A, which includes the text of some of the relevant GATT provisions.

1234

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1227

recycle, or appropriately dispose of the product when the ENV
consumer is finished with the product's useful life. Such centers are
relatively easy for domestic producers to establish, but much more
difficult for importers (or exporters in EXP), and particularly
difficult for EXP sellers of small quantities (which is often the case
for new market entrants) to establish.
- ENV establishes a subsidy for machinery purchased and used
by domestic producers to assist in environmental protection (such
as smoke stack cleaners). The subsidy could be in the form of
special income tax depreciation deductions. When products from
plants benefitting from the subsidy are exported, foreign countries
such as IMP apply a countervailing duty to the exports to offset
the benefits of the "subsidy."
- ENV establishes a border tax (countervailing duty) on any
electronics product that is imported from a country that does not
have an environmental rule required by ENV. ENV argues that the
lack of such a rule is in effect a "subsidy" when measured by
economic principles of internalization and "polluter pays," and that
the subsidy should be off-set by a countervailing duty. EXP argues
that while its own method of pollution control is different, it is
fully adequate and more efficient than ENV's and is also cheaper.
Consequently, EXP argues either that its products should not incur
the clean up duty or that its environment can better withstand
pollution activity.
- ENV prohibits the importation of tropical hardwoods on the
ground that imports of tropical hardwood products tend to induce
deforestation in important tropical forest areas, and that such
deforestation damages the world environment. ENV is a temperate
zone nation with temperate forests, but does not apply any rule
against temperate forest products, domestic or imported.
ENV has an important fishing fleet that captures salmon and
herring. It also has an important fish processing industry. ENV
establishes a rule against the exportation of the unprocessed salmon
or herring caught within its territorial and protected zone area,
arguing that landing those fish at its ports is necessary for an
appropriate count of the fish supply. This count is needed for
economic and environmental models designed to assist regulators in
limiting the catch and promoting the growth of the fish supply.
Local ENV fish processing plants enjoy the benefit of avoiding
competition for purchase of the fish by foreign processors in IMP.
ENV prohibits the sale of domestic or imported vegetables that
have been genetically engineered to achieve certain characteristics,
such as longer shelf life and better color. Its domestic industry does
not use these genetically engineered plants, while certain foreign
countries do. The foreign countries wish to export to ENV, arguing
that the genetically engineered products are equal in every respect,
and better in some respects, to the safety and other characteristics
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of products that are not so engineered.
IMP establishes a rule against the importation of products from
any producer in a foreign country that utilizes women in its factory.
IMP argues that it is culturally offensive to its domestic producers
to utilize women in their factories. Furthermore, because IMP
prohibits the employment of women in factories, it- feels obliged to
prohibit the importation of goods that were produced from female
labor.
A number of different trade policy problems are posed by the examples
above and some of these will be discussed further under specific parts
below. As a logical exercise one can use an unrealistic hypothetical to
illustrate the conflict between trade policy and environmental policy. Imagine
a country, ENV, establishing a rule that prohibits the importation of
products from "any country that pollutes." Presumably that would cause
virtually all trade to cease, totally undermining the GATT/MTO policies of
liberalization. Although the example is extreme, one thing seems reasonably
clear: The GATT/MTO system, and its policy and government specialists,
need to change so as to better accommodate environmental policies. All too
often during the past decade, it has appeared that the trade policy specialists
have feared the incursion of the environmental policies on their terrain
(partly because the environmental policies can be so easily used as an excuse
for protectionism), and this fear has led to a certain attitude of "feriding
off," or other "lack of friendliness" towards environmental policies. Likewise, there has been a certain "unfriendliness" on the part of some of the
environmental policy experts towards trade policies, reflected in large news23
paper advertisements and "anti-GATT-zilla" posters!
The purpose of this paper is to probe the differences between the two
policy sets, and to identify ways in which some of those differences can be
narrowed. It is-not possible to cover all of the problems that are involved
in this clash, so I will focus on a selected number of key legal and
institutional issues: particularly ihe problem of national treatment and its
relation to product standards (Part II); the problem of the general exceptions
in GATT Article XX (Part 'III); the related problem of the "processproduct" characteristics that have been involved in the tuna/dolphin case,
and concern with what is sometimes called the global commons (Part IV);
the intricate and elaborate problem of subsidies (Part V); the subject of
"competitiveness" (Part VI); and finally, a certain group of institutional
problems related to the GATT/MTO system, including dispute settlement,
transparency, and jurisprudence (Part VII).
II. NATIONAL TREATMENT AND PRODUCT STANDARDS
One of the core principles of the GATT/MTO system of trade liberalization is the rule known as "national treatment," found in GATT Article
23. See SABOTAGE! of America's Health, Food Safety and EnvironmentalLaws, N.Y.
TrmEs (Midwest ed.), Apr. 20, 1992, at B5; see also Nancy Dunne, Fears Over "GATT-Zilla
the Trade Monster," FIN. TimFs, Jan. 30, 1992, at 3.
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III. The national treatment clause can be traced far back into treaties of
centuries ago, and is applied to a number of different governmental activities. 24 For purposes of a variety of governmental actions, it obligates a
government to treat foreign products or persons the same as it treats its
domestic products or persons. Before World War II, the national treatment
clause was perhaps most commonly found in the Treaties of Friendship
Commerce and Navigation (FCN Treaties), and in that context called for
nondiscriminatory treatment by treaty parties with respect to citizens or
firms of the other party to a treaty, operating within the territory of a
treaty party. This principle has been applied extensively to issues of arrest
and criminal process, and human rights.
In traditional international law practice there were two possible dimensions of national treatment. On the one hand, national treatment was
deemed to be a rule of "nondiscrimination," requiring a government to
treat aliens in a manner no less favorable than it treats its own citizens.
However, under that approach, if its treatment of its own citizens was very
bad (for example arbitrary arrest, or very poor jail conditions) similar
treatment of foreigners would comply with the clause. Thus, there developed
a second aspect of national treatment under phraseology and customary
practice of certain treaty clauses that requires a certain minimum standard
of treatment.
In general, the GATT national treatment clause (expressed in ten
paragraphs of Article III, with certain exceptions built in) opted primarily
for the nondiscrimination standard.2Y Thus it has been said that while GATT
requires a nation to tax and regulate imports from other GATT parties in
a manner no less favorable than it treats its domestic product, if a government imposed a regulation on its domestic product that is utterly foolish,
it could also impose such a regulation on imported products. The government, for example, could prohibit the sale of both domestic and imported
shampoo when the container showed a picture of a blond woman. Likewise,
it could arguably prohibit the sale of domestic and imported products if
the label contained any words in a language other than that of the importing
country. Thus, the latter regulation often requires specialized labels on
imports.
The GATT, however, does contain some language in paragraph 1 of
Article III which states that regulations and taxes shall not be imposed in
a way "so as to afford protection" against import competition. Thus,
GATT contains some element of minimum standard that is related to
principles of liberal trade. This type of minimum standard has resulted in
an interpretation of Article III that prohibits government regulation even
when it appears "on its face" to be nondiscriminatory, if in fact it is "de

24. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND GATT, supra note 1, at 273-303; JACKSON &
supra note 1, at 266, 483-537.
25. See GATT, supra note 10, art. III, 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204; see also
sources cited supra note 23.
DAVEY,
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facto" discriminatory. An important case in United States jurisprudence of
some decades ago struggled with this concept 26 and GATT panel cases and
other discussions have made references to the problem of government
regulation that affords effective protection, even though on its face it
appears neutral. 27
One example of a de facto discriminatory regulation would be a regulation that imposed a higher tax on automobiles with greater horse power
and speed, when the importing country knew that its own automobile
production tended to concentrate heavily in automobiles with lesser horse
power and speed. Likewise, a less favorable tax treatment for automobiles
priced in excess of a certain amount of money, say $25,000, in circumstances
where domestic production tended not to produce such higher priced autos
while imports tended to concentrate in them, could be suspect. Clearly there
are some difficult issues in these circumstances, particularly because governments may have a legitimate regulatory -interest in classifying goods in
certain ways, for example, taxing luxury goods more heavily than daily
staples. Thus, there are some delicate decisions that, have to be made in
interpreting the GATT Article III.
Similar issues of interpretation arise in a number of "environmental"
type cases. For example, an Ontario regulation 28 imposing. a higher tax on
the sale of beverages in aluminum containers than on other types of
containers is arguably designed to help environmental matters. On the other
hand, when it is discovered that very few Ontario-made beverages are sold
in aluminum cans, while imports from the United States are very frequently
sold in those containers, the regulation becomes suspect as a "de facto
discrimination." The key issue then becomes one of determining who should
decide whether the regulation is appropriate.
Even if a regulation is both facially nondiscriminatory and also de facto
nondiscriminatory, some important issues about a "minimum standard"
arise. The Beef Hormone Case, a current significant case between the United
States and the European Community (EC) raised this issue. 29 In that case
the EC had prohibited the sale of beef that had been grown with the
assistance of artificial hormone infusions. The United States argued that it
applied hormones by a method that was totally safe for human ingestion,
and that the EC had no scientific basis for its regulation, which incidentally
happened to hurt U.S. exports of beef products to the EC. The EC replied
that it had no obligation to provide a scientific justification for its regulation.

26. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1, at 496; see Report of the GA 7T Panel, United
States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, para. 3.18, GATT Doc. L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989),
BASIC INSTRUMENTS

AND SELECTED

DOCUMENTS [hereinafter BISD] 36th Supp. 345, 360 [here-

inafter Section 337 PanelReport].
27. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1, at 483-537; Report of the GATT Panel, United
States-Alcoholic Beverages, GATT Doc. DS23/R (Mar. 16, 1992).
28. See, e.g., Beer Blast, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1992, at A14.
29. See Janice Castro, Why the Beef Over Hormones, TIME, Jan. 16, 1989, at 44.
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This dispute has festered. The United States pointed to a clause in the
Tokyo Round Standards Code30 that might have given some opportunity to
require scientific justification for a product regulation. However, negotiators
in the Uruguay Round have developed a draft phyto-sanitary text designed
government regulation requiring
to provide some minimum standards for
"scientific principles" as justification."a This draft text has raised some
serious concerns on the part of environmental policy experts in the United
States and elsewhere. The experts worry that this text would inhibit national
governments, or sub-federal governmental units, from determining the appropriateness of a regulation that went beyond some minimum international
standard. The language of the text itself does not seem to call for this, but
the implication is that there will be an opportunity for exporting countries
to challenge regulations of importing countries and to require importing
countries to justify their regulations on the basis of "sound science." This
raises substantial fears that GATT panels will tend to rule against regulations
that go beyond a lowest common denominator of national environmental
regulations in the GATT/MTN system.3 2 This concern pushes the discourse
into the question of institutions.
In summary, the GATT relatively easily accommodates national government environmental regulations that concern the characteristics of imported products. Thus, if a nation wishes to prohibit the sale of domestic
and imported croissants which have a high cholesterol content, presumably
this would be consistent with the GATT obligations of Article III. Under
the Tokyo Round Standards Code and the Uruguay Round phyto-sanitary
draft text approach there might be some opportunity to challenge the
regulation. Nevertheless, it would seem that the national treatment standard
would not be a major impediment or a major conceptual problem for
environmental regulation, unless a requirement of scientific justification was
interpreted to require such a high degree of justification as to unreasonably
inhibit governments from imposing environmental standards. To ensure
against that, it might be useful to have some interpretive notes for the
Uruguay Round text.33

30. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. L/4812 (Nov. 12, 1979),
BISD 26th Supp. 8, 8. Article 2, paragraph 2.1 states that "[p]arties shall ensure that technical
regulations and standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles
to international trade." Id. para. 2.1, at 9. The Agreement also provides "technical expert
groups" to assist dispute settlement panels. Id. annex 2, at 31.
31. Dunkel Draft, supra note 11. See Text on Agriculture, Part C, which at paragraph
6 reads: "Contracting parties shall ensure that sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures are applied
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, are based on
scientific principles and are not maintained against available scientific evidence." Id. § L,
para. 6, at L.36.
32. See Stewart Hudson, Trade, Environment, and the Pursuit of Sustainable Development, Paper Prepared for World Bank Symposium on International Trade and Environment,
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 1991) (transcript available from author). Stewart Hudson is with the
National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C.
33. Some text in the October 7, 1992 NAFTA draft is interesting in connection with the
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The minimum standard scientific justification approach can be very
significant for the future of trade rules in the GATT/MTN system. For
certain interests within a large country like the United States to argue that
there should never be an international "second guess" (such as a tribunal
process) of any national regulations in the environmental, or other area,
could prevent important international cooperative measures to allow the
trading system to evolve in a way to meet the new challenge. But there are
some legitimate concerns on the part of the environmental policy advocates,
and further work needs to be taken in the GATT/MTO context, some of
which will extend over the next decade, to address those concerns. Briefly,
the major concerns include:
1) The question of how difficult it will be to justify national or
sub-federal governmental unit regulations on environmental matters,
in the context of international dispute settlement processes and a
new treaty text that requires certain minimum standards of scientific
justification for such regulations;
2) The amount of latitude that will be granted to nation-states to
impose environmental regulations that require higher standards than
some international minimum.
III.

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS IN ARTICLE XX: HEALTH & CONSERVATION

The GATT contains an Article XX entitled "General Exceptions" which
includes important provisions that override other obligations of the GATT,
under certain circumstances defined in the Article. Again it is not practical
or appropriate in this paper to deal with all of Article XX, but there are
certain key measures that should be addressed. Quite often, concern for
34
environmental matters focuses on paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX:
(See Annex A).
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption...
The exceptions of Article XX are subject to some important qualifications in the opening paragraph of Article XX, however, which reads as
follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable

burdens of scientific proof. For example, articles 904(3), 905(3), and 907, which are quoted
in Annex C. The language specifies a right of governments to use a "higher level of protection"
for the environmental international standards.
34. GATT, supra note 10, art. XX, 61 Stat. at 1460, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262; see JACKSON
& DAV EY, supra note 1, at 514 (Doc. Supp. 1989); OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 32.
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discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures.
To a large degree, these provisions provide a softened measure of
"national treatment," and MFN obligations. They require governments that
take measures which arguably qualify for the exceptions of Article XX to
do so in such a way as to minimize the impacts mentioned in the opening
paragraph. This has led some panel reports to interpret Article XX 35 to
require nations to use the "least restrictive alternative" reasonably available
to it as measures designed to support the goals of the exceptions of Article
XX.
There are a number of important interpretive problems with respect to
Article XX, and some of them are key to the environmental-trade liberalization clash. Two interpretive questions in particular stand out, namely the
interpretation of the word "necessary," and the question of whose health,
or which exhaustible natural resources can be the object of an acceptable
national government regulation.
The word "necessary" clearly needs interpretive attention. It is partly
interpreted by the "least restrictive alternative" jurisprudence mentioned
above. Thus, if there are two or more alternatives that a government could
use to protect human life or health, it is not "necessary" to choose the
one that places more restrictions on trade, when an alternative that is
equally efficient in protecting human life or health exists. This will obviously
impose some restraint on the latitude that nations, or sub-federal governments have to impose regulations for environmental purposes .16 On the
other hand, it is considered important to prevent Article XX from becoming
a large loop hole that governments can use to justify almost any measures
that are motivated by protectionist considerations. It is this slippery slope
problem that worries many in connection with Article XX. The problem
arises in a number of cases, including the packaging and fish examples that
were discussed in the introduction.
The other interpretive problem is conceptually more difficult. When
GATT Article XX provides an exception for measures necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health, should it be interpreted to mean
only the life or health of humans within the importing country, or extend
to the life or health of humans throughout the world? This interpretive
problem is intimately related to the process-product characteristic difficulty.
As far as this author can determine, Article XX has not been interpreted

35. Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 5.26, BISD 36th Supp. at 393;
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Disupe Settlement Panel Report on Thai Restrictions
on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991).
36. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin
Panel Report].
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to allow a government to impose regulations to protect the life or health
of humans, animals, or plants that exist outside of the government's own
territorial borders. This problem was addressed, although somewhat ambiguously, in the tuna/dolphin case.37 The problem is that of the typical
slippery slope danger, combined with the concern that powerful and wealthy
countries will impose their own views regarding environmental or other
social or welfare standards on other parts of the world, even where such
views may not be entirely appropriate. The term "eco-imperialism" has
3
been coined for this problem. 1
If a nation can prohibit the importation of goods from a poor third
world country where the method of production is moderately dangerous to
humans, why would a nation not also be able to prohibit the importation
of goods produced in an environment that differs in many social or cultural
attributes from its own society? Why should one country be able to use its
trade laws to depart from the general liberal trade rules of the GATT/
MTO system, to enforce its own view of how plant or animal life in the
oceans (beyond territorial sea, or other jurisdictional limits), or to protect
the ozone layer (as suggested in the tropical hardwoods hypothetical case)?
Other countries may have a somewhat different view of the trade-off
between economic and welfare values of production, and human life or
health. Even in the industrial countries, there is tolerance of certain kinds
of economic activity that almost inevitably will result in human deaths or
injuries, an example being major construction projects for dams or bridges.
These are tough issues, and ones that will require a lot of close and careful
attention, presumably in the context not only of new rule making or treaty
drafting, but also in the processes of interpretation through the dispute
settlement mechanisms. Thus, once again, institutional questions become
significant.
It has been argued by one author39 that the drafting history, of the
GATT would lead to an interpretation of Article XX that would permit
governments to take a variety of environmental measures and justify them
under the general exceptions of GATT. While this view is interesting, and
the research is apparently thorough, it is not entirely persuasive and overlooks important issues of treaty interpretation. Under typical international
law, elaborated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 40 preparatory work history is an ancillary means of interpreting treaties. In the

37. Id.
38. Gijs M. DeVries, How to Banish Eco-Imperialism, J. COM., Apr. 30, 1992, at 8A.
39. Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25
J. WORLD TRADE 37, 37-55 (1991). A more recent article by Chamovitz, which has just come
to the attention of this author and with which this author substantially agrees, is Steve
Charnovitz, Environmental and Labor Standards in Trade, 15 WORLD ECON. 335, 335-56

(1992).
40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, arts. 31, 32, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-97 (entered into force Jan. 27,

1980).
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context of interpreting the GATT, we have more than forty years of practice
since the origin of GATT, and we also have some very important policy
questions raised by the "slippery slope arguments" mentioned above. Thus,
unlike certain schools of thought concerning United States Supreme Court
view that
interpretation of the United States Constitution, it is this author's
4
one cannot rely too heavily on the original drafting history. '
IV.

THE PROCESS-PRODUCT PROBLEM: THE TUNA DOLPHIN CASE & THE
GLOBAL COMMONS QUESTIONS

An important conceptual "difficulty" of GATT is the so-called processproduct characteristic problem, which relates closely to the Article XX
exceptions and also to the national treatment obligations and other provi43
sions of GATT. 42 This issue is central to the so-called tuna/dolphin case
and needs to be explained.
Suppose that an importing country wishes to prohibit the sale of
domestic or imported automobiles that emit more pollutants in their exhaust
than permitted by a specified standard. Subject to the discussion in Part
II, there seems to be little difficulty with this regulation. It relates to the
characteristics of the product itself. If the product itself is polluting, then
on a nondiscriminatory, basis the government may prohibit its sale (or also
prohibit its importation, as a measure to prohibit its sale)."
Suppose, on the other hand, that the government feels that an automobile plant in a foreign country is operated in such a way that it poses
substantial hazards to human health, possibly through dangers of accidents
from the machinery, pollutants or unduly high temperatures in the factory.
On an apparently nondiscriminatory basis, the government may wish to
impose a prohibition on the sale of domestic or imported automobiles that
are produced in factories with certain characteristics. However, in this case
it should be noted that the imported automobiles themselves are perfectly
appropriate and do not have dangerous or polluting characteristics. Thus,
the target of the importing country's regulation is the production "process."
The key question under the GATT/MTO system is whether the importing
country is justified either under national treatment rules of nondiscrimination, or the exceptions of Article XX (which do not require strict national

41. The criticism regarding some theories of interpretation refers to various doctrines of
"original intent" in connection with theories of U.S. Constitutional interpretation.
42. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1, at 448, 514; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Effective
Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries: International Economic Disincentives, Policy
Responses and the GATT, 70 MIcH. L. REV. 859 (1972); see also supra note 25.
43. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 36; see JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,
supra note 1, at 197-99; GATT REPORT 90-91, supra note 21, at 27; OTA REPORT, supra note
21, at 49; see also supra note 37.
44. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text (discussing- national treatment and
product standards); see also JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1, at 448 (citing to GATT Report
on Belgian Family Allowances adopted by GATT Contracting Parties on November 7, 1952);
GATT, supra note 10, annex 1, 61 Stat. at A85-90, 55 U.N.T.S. at 292-305.
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treatment nondiscrimination as was discussed above). Trade policy experts
are concerned that if a nation is allowed to use the process characteristic
as the basis for trade restrictive measures, then the result would be to open
a pandora's box of problems that could open large loopholes in the GATT.
The following are some hypothetical illustrations of potential "process"
45
problems further down the road:
An importing country prohibits the sale of radios, whether
domestic or imported, that are produced by workers who are paid
less than a minimum amount of wages specified by the importing
country. This minimum amount might be the importing country's
own minimum wage, or it might be an amount considerably less
but still substantial (in deference to poor countries).
An importing country that prohibits women from working in
certain types of manufacturing plants also prohibits the importation
of goods produced in similar plants that utilize women employees.
An importing country that specifies a weekly religious holiday,
for example, Saturday or Sunday, prohibits the importation of
goods produced by work on the specified religious holiday.
An importing country has strong political interests regarding
the threat to marine mammals from certain fishing practices on the
high seas, and thus prohibits the sale of products from both its
domestic fishing industry and from foreign fishing if the products
come from countries that permit the destructive fishing practices.
Obviously the tuna/dolphin case 46 relates to these issues. Although the
GATT panel report. is not entirely clear on this matter, it seems fair to say
that there were two important objections to the U.S. embargo on the
importation of tuna. First, there is the question of "eco-imperialism,"
where one nation unilaterally imposes its fishing standards (albeit for
environmental purposes) on other nations in the world without their consent
or participation in the development of the standard. Second, there is the
problem that the import embargo is inconsistent with the GATT rules unless
there is some GATT exception that would permit the embargo. Of course,
that exception relates to the "process-product" interpretation problem and
therefore also to the problem in the national treatment rule (Article III)
and the general exceptions of GATT (Article XX).
The approach in the GATT system so far has given great weight to this
slippery slope concern, and thus tilted towards interpreting both the Article
III (including some Article XI questions) and the Article XX exceptions to
apply to the product standards and to life and health within the importing
country, but not to extend these concepts and exceptions to "processes"
outside the territorial limits of jurisdiction. The alternative which threatens
to create the great loop hole is a serious worry. The theories of comparative

45. See sources cited supra note 20, 38-40.
46. See Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 36.
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advantage which drive the policy of liberal trade, suggest that differences
among nations are an important reason for trade. These can be differences
of natural resources, as well as differences of cultural and population
characteristics such as education, training, investment, and environment. To
allow an exception to GATT to permit some governments to unilaterally
impose standards on production processes as a condition of importation
would substantially undermine these policy objectives of trade liberalization.
On the other hand, trade sanctions, which include embargoes, are a very
attractive and potentially useful means of providing enforcement of international cooperatively developed standards, including environmental standards.
Thus, there is an important trade-off that the GATT must face. It is
not adequate, in this writer's view, for the GATT simply to say that trade
should never be used as a sanction for environmental (or human rights, or
anti-prison labor) purposes. There are already a number of situations in
which the GATT has at least tolerated, if not explicitly accepted, trade
sanction type activity for what is perceived to be valid overriding international objectives. 47 What are the implications of this problem? To this
writer, it seems clear that the GATT/MTO system must give specific and
significant attention to this trade-off in order to provide for exceptions for
environmental purposes. The exceptions should have well-established boundaries so as to prevent them from being used as excuses for a variety of
protectionist devices or unilateral social welfare concerns. Possibly these
exceptions should be limited to the situation where governments are protecting matters that occur within their territorial jurisdiction.
It may be feasible to develop an explicit exception in the GATT/MTO
system, possibly by the waiver process which is reasonably efficient, 4 for a
certain list of specified broad-based multilateral treaties. One of the concerns
expressed about the tuna/dolphin case in GATT is the implications that it
might have for the so-called "Montreal Protocol" concerning chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and the danger to the Earth's ozone layer. The Montreal
Protocol 9 provides a potential future authorization of trade sanction measures against even nonsignatories for processes, not product characteristics,
that violate the norms of the treaty. If the current rules of the GATT are

47. Instances where the GATT has tolerated such uses include the imposition of trade
sanctions on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Article XXI of GATT provides an exception
for national security, and for measures in pursuance of a Contracting Parties "obligations
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security."
GATT, supra note 23, art. XXI, 61 Stat. at A63, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266. The GATT Analytical
Index to Article XXI reports various practices that have been tolerated by the GATT system,
including an Egyptian boycott against Israel, an EC action during the Falkland/Malvinas
situation, and United States measures prohibiting trade involving Nicaragua.
48. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND GATT, supra note 1, at 541-52; see also Annex

B.
49. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. See a description

of this problem in OTA

REPORT,

supra note 21, at 43-46.
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interpreted to exclude exceptions for the process situation, the Montreal
Protocol Measures, except as among the signatories to the Montreal Protocol, would be contrary to GATT obligations. 0 It may take some time
and study to develop the precise wording of an appropriate amendment or
treaty. exception for the GATT/MTO system for these environmental treaty
cases, but in the short run for a limited period of years, it could be efficient
to use a GATT waiver to clarify the issue as to specifically named treaties."
In all likelihood, there are a sufficient number of signatories to the
Montreal Protocol that are also GATT members so that a GATT waiver
authorizing the trade measures contemplated in the Montreal Protocol could
be adopted. Adoption of a waiver requires approval by two-thirds vote of
the GATT contracting parties. But at the same time, it might be wise to
go a few steps further and include in such a waiver several other specified
treaties.5 2 Obviously the waiver can also be amended in the future to add
more specifically named treaties.
Even under such a waiver approach, there are still some important
policy and treaty drafting questions that must be faced. For example, should
the exception to the GATT be worded to apply only to the mandatory trade
measures required by the specified environmental treaties? Or should it also
be extended to those measures that are deemed discretionary but "authorized" by the environmental treaties? Or, would the GATT waiver even go
one step further and authorize GATT members to take trade measures
unilaterally to help enforce the substantive environmental norms contained
in the environmental treaties, even when such environmental treaties do not
have trade measures or sanctions indicated in the their treaty texts?
V.

SUBsmEs

The problem of subsidies in international trade policy is perhaps the
single most perplexing issue of the current world trading system, and one
that is very complex. Some of the major controversies and negotiation
impasses, such as the question of agriculture, relate to this problem. The
GATT rules have become increasingly elaborate, and contain several different dimensions. Not only are there provisions in the GATT itself (Articles
VI and XVI), but there is also the Tokyo Round "Code" on subsidies and

50. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49. See OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 44. The OTA
Report notes that the Montreal Protocol has seventy nine members. GATT has more than one
hundred members, and a waiver requires two-thirds of those voting, which must include at
least one-half of the total membership.
51. Some language used in the NAFTA text suggests the possibility of a GATT waiver
along the same lines as the NAFTA article 104. See Annex C, art. 104.

52. Apart from the Montreal Protocol, other treaties mentioned as candidates for a
GATT waiver include: The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 27, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG. 80-3 (1989),
reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 657 and The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter
CITES].
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countervailing duties which provides obligations to the signatories of that
code. 3 It is not feasible in this paper to go into great detail about the
subsidies question. Indeed, the subsidies question in relation to environmental policies may be one of the most intricate and difficult issues facing
the world trading system during the next decade. Here I will only outline
some of the major characteristics and problems of the potential clash
between trade policies and environmental policies in relation to subsidies.
First, to look briefly at the subsidy trade rules,3 4 the trade system has
traditionally divided subsidies into two types: export subsidies (subsidies
that apply only to exported products), and general subsidies (subsidies that
apply to all products produced in the country, whether exported or not).
The international system has imposed considerably more restraint on the
use of export subsidies, thus deeming them to be particularly suspect.
Subsidies can have at least three different kinds of impacts on international trade. Two of these relate to exports from a subsidizing country
regardless of whether the subsidies are general or export subsidies. First,
the subsidized exports can have an impact on an importing country, and
the rules will often allow the importing country to impose a so-called
"countervailing duty" to offset the effect of the subsidized imports. Second,
subsidized exports may be introduced into a third country market to which
a nonsubsidizing country is also exporting. In that case, the countervailing
duty remedy is not available. The international system (GATT and the
Subsidies Code) imposes specific international obligations on the use of
certain kinds of subsidies, and it is this international obligation and its
enforcement procedures (through dispute settlement) that is almost the only
available remedy to the competing nonsubsidizing country in its complaint
against that country that subsidizes. This international rule enforcement
mechanism and dispute settlement process has been one of the most troublesome areas in the GATT, and there is considerable thought that the
Tokyo Round Subsidies Code has largely failed in this respect. It should
also be noted that the United States is the only major user of countervailing
duties, although there is some evidence that other countries are now interested in increasing their use of them.
The third influence of subsidies on trade is to inhibit imports into a
subsidizing country. If an importing country subsidizes its domestic producers, these producers can often reduce their prices and thus inhibit imports
that are not equally subsidized simply through increased price, quality, or
other forms of competition. Indeed, the system is tilted against imports in
that it permits a subsidizing importing country to subsidize its domestic

53. Agreement on Interpretationand Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, GATT
Doc. L/4812 (Nov. 12, 1979), BISD 26th Supp. 56. The current number of signatories to this
Convention is approximately twenty-five (25). See GATT Doc. L/6453 and addenda (through
Mar. 12, 1992).
54. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 249-73; JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND

GATT, supra note 1, at 365-99;

JACKSON

&

DAVEY,

supra note 1, at 723-89.
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product, and yet impose a countervailing duty on imports that are equally
subsidized!
An underlying problem for all of these complex rules concerning subsidies is the definition of "subsidy" itself. The definition is often stated in
very broad terms such that it would include governmental measures such
as fire and police protection, roads, and schools. If the subsidy definition
is so broad, the various trade response rules, particularly the countervailing
duty, could totally undermine the liberal trading system. Thus, it has been
necessary either to use a restricted definition of subsidy, or to define a
"subset" of the broader set which subset is called "actionable" and thus
subject to trade response measures. 5
Having presented this all too brief outline of the general trade subsidies
rules in the GATT/MTO system, it is now important to turn to how they
might apply in the environmental context. The following hypothetical cases
can illustrate some of the problems that could occur:
Suppose an exporting country establishes a subsidy for certain
of its manufacturing companies that allows them to receive grants
or tax privileges for establishing environmental enhancement measures (such as machinery to clean up smoke or water emissions, or
other capital goods for environmental or safety and health purposes). When those producers export their goods, the goods could
be vulnerable to foreign nations imposing countervailing duties. Is
this appropriate or should a special exception for environmental
measures be carved out?
Suppose an exporting country lacks meaningful environmental
rules, and exports goods into an importing country that has strict
environmental rules for its manufacturers. The importing country's
domestic industry will likely complain about what it perceives to be
"unfair import competition." Can the importing country argue that
the lack of environmental rules in the exporting country is the
equivalent of a "subsidy" and impose a countervailing duty? Again
this poses a slippery slope problem. Could such an importing country
likewise impose countervailing duties 'against imports based on the
argument that the imports were produced in a country that lacked
competition policy (antitrust laws)? Or lacked minimum standards
of safety and health in the factories? This is a problem that closely
relates to the process-product characteristic problem discussed in
Part IV.
- Similarly, suppose a nation lacks environmental rules such that
its domestic producers can produce goods cheaper than its competitors and thus compete to keep out goods that are imported from
other countries that have substantial environmental rules. In that
-

55. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 249-73; Dunkel Draft, supra
note 11 (Draft Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures).
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situation, the lack of environmental rules becomes an effective
protectionist device.
Obviously these hypotheticals are not so "hypothetical." A good part
of the discourse about the proposed NAFTA treaty expresses the concern
that if Mexico lacks environmental rules it will have a competitive advantage
vis-d-vis American or Canadian producers.5 6 These problems illustrate the
need for careful examination of the subsidy rules so as to design appropriate
environmental exceptions or rules without destroying the advantages of the
subsidy rules. These environmental exceptions or rules should probably
include:
1) A modification to the definition of "actionable subsidy" to
allow certain types of environment enhancing government benefits
and to exempt them from countervailing duties or other trade

obligations.
2) A provision allowing trade restrictions, whether called "countervailing" or not, under authority of other multilateral treaties
designed to enforce certain international agreements.
3) A recognition that just because the environmental rules of an
exporting nation are not as stringent as those of an importing
nation, the latter should not apply "countervailing duties" based
on a subsidy theory. On the other hand, international minimum
standards might be formulated over time, possibly creating a benchmark required for goods to move freely in international trade.
VI.

EXPORTS AND COMPETITIVENESS

Apart from the problems of the various technical rules of the GATT
discussed above, there are also some important additional considerations
for the relationship and possible effect of trade liberalization on environmental policies. One of those can be characterized as the question of
"competitiveness." The situation is as follows: an exporting country has
important environmental rules and standards, which its producers meet.
These environmental efforts obviously have a cost, and the producers must
bear those costs and build them into the price structure of the products
that they export. These products compete in other countries with products
from countries that do not have such environmental standards or efforts.
This could be the case when the environmentalist country exports to a
relatively nonenvironmentalist country, or when the two countries compete
in some third market. Because the producers in the nonenvironmentalist
country escape the cost of the environmental regulations, presumably they
can produce at a lower cost and thus offer their product at a lower price.

56. The Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at A2, C3. See also the reports of
discussions on the environment in the July 10, 1992 issue of relation to the NAFTA agreement
in
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The concern of the producers in the environmentalist country is that this
will be a form of competition for them that will be hard to meet and, thus,
in their minds, is "unfair" because they are contributing to the world
environment by their compliance with environmental standards.
This problem was touched on in the previous section when we discussed
subsidies, but even apart from the rules of subsidies it can be an important
problem, especially as it relates to political perceptions. Furthermore, because it is primarily a question of "export competitiveness," it does not
get discussed in connection with many of the problems of national treatment,
or the general exceptions to the GATT, which have been previously expressed. There are some GATT rules that cover exports, but they are not
closely related to the problem posed here.
To some extent, this problem is similar to many other problems resulting
from differences among societies. Some societies will have more stringent
rules with respect to plant worker safety. Other societies will have stringent
rules regarding family allowances or holidays. Still other societies will have
minimum wages, and many other social measures can differ from society
to society. As indicated earlier in this paper, attempts to use trade rules to
make the world uniform in this regard could be futile and very damaging
to the underlying policies of trade liberalization. Thus, the questions posed
are whether environmental policies are substantially different than some of
the other policies mentioned, and if so, do they deserve a different kind of
treatment in the world trading system.
First, it might be conceptually feasible to separate the environmental
problems that affect only the environment of the country concerned (within
its borders), from other problems that have an effect either across borders,
or, even more broadly, on the world's environment (the global commons).
It could be, and has been, argued that because different countries vary in
their degrees of environmental quality, and in the extent to which they
tolerate environmental problems as a trade-off to gaining other benefits
(such as eating better), that these issues can and should be left to the
national sovereign states. Consequently,, the international trading system
ought not to try to redress or "harmonize" the different environmental
approaches. Obviously there are many intricacies in this argument, and
57
some of them have already been subjects of full papers elsewhere.
Perhaps the more important question relates to the situation where the
environmental degradation is of a type that impacts on the world as a
whole, or at least on countries other than the acting or exporting nation.
Here we have something of the "free rider" problem, or "prisoner's
dilemma" issue, that points towards the need for international cooperation.
Given the imperfections of the international system, and particularly its

57. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Why The Sins of One Economist Should Not Be Visited
On All, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at 21; A Greener Bank, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1992, at 79
(talking about World Bank's World Development Report, and mentioning provocative memo
by Lawrence Summers, the Bank's Chief Economist).
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system for developing new rules (with its least common denominator constraints) environmental policy experts can legitimately argue that there must
be some room for unilateral nation state actions designed to support the
world environment. This is perhaps the trickiest area for which to develop
appropriate policy. It relates closely to the process-product characteristic
question discussed above. Certainly the optimal approach would seem to
be through broad based multilateral treaties and rules, which then in turn
raises the question of how to make such rules effective. This latter question
quite often leads to a focus on trade sanctions as a means to make such
rules effective, and as, indicated earlier, an argument can be made that there
should be an explicit exception in the GATT for certain kinds of trade
actions to help enhance the effectiveness of international environmental
rules, while preventing misuse of the exception.
Let us return for a moment to the first category of problems, those in
which the environmental issues involve the environment only within the
producing country, or the importing country which has competing producers
that will benefit from lack of environmental rules. In some of these cases,
the importing country's political system would in fact desire some additional
pressures on its decision making processes to help induce the development
of environmental rules. This is a common feature of the relationship of
international action, particularly in the area of economic affairs, but also
in the human rights area. In many cases, domestic leaders find it politically
difficult to implement a preferred course of action unless there is some
external pressure that helps them in their domestic advocacy, and also in
some cases gives them an "excuse" for taking that action.
Some of this attitude certainly exists in the context of environmental.
rules," and- may in fact justify a broader approach in the GATT/MTO
trading system. Thus, it could well be feasible and worthwhile, although
time-consuming, to develop some rules in the trading system that impose
certain kinds of harmonizing minimum level standards for environmental
protection. In the alternative, rules that impose certain kinds of trade
detriments, such as compensatory duties, on countries that do not adopt or
enforce the harmonized or minimal environmental rules, might also be
worthwhile.
VII.

THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT,
TRANSPARENCY,

AND JURISPRUDENCE

The GATT is a rather strange and troubled institution. It was born
with several birth defects because it was never meant to be an organization.
Instead, it was intended that an International Trade Organization (ITO)
Charter would come into effect that would provide the institutional framework, in which the GATT would be one part. Because of this troubled

58. These views on external pressure are expressed in private conversations with various
foreign government officials, but are not generaliy stated in public, or in publications.
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birth history, the GATT has always been deficient in the institutional clauses
normally found in a treaty establishing an international organization.59 These
problems have become increasingly troublesome as world economic developments have gone beyond the rules provided by the GATT system. Some
of these problems are being addressed in the current Uruguay Round GATT
negotiation, and if that is ultimately successful, it may help improve the
institutional situation. Other GATT issues include problems of accepting
new members, particularly those with different economic structures; the
problem of assisting developing countries; the difficulty of facing up to
some of the more newly appreciated issues that are effecting international
trade flows, such as cultural and economic structural differences; questions
of competition policy (antitrust); and, of course, environmental policies.
More broadly, the GATT generally suffers from institutional deficiencies
in the two essential ingredients for an effective international organization,
namely the making of new rules, and the provisions for making those rules
effective through dispute settlement procedures. With respect to rule making,
the GATT basically relies heavily on a consensus treaty making process.
With a membership that now exceeds one hundred countries, this becomes
extremely difficult. This difficulty is accentuated by the MFN obligations
that give rise to a potential "free rider" problem of nonsigning countries
receiving the benefits of new agreements. This in turn tends to force
negotiations towards a consensus for a new rule, into a "least common
denominator" approach.
Likewise, the dispute settlement procedures of the GATT have been
troubled. The actual GATT clauses setting them up are extremely sketchy.
Nevertheless, through trial and error and general practice over four decades,
the GATT dispute settlement procedures have now developed into a remarkably full procedure that has been largely, but not totally, effective. Its
effectiveness has been such, however, as to attract various interests Who see
in the GATT dispute settlement procedures an important attribute for subject
matters that they would like to see.placed under the GATT, such as the
area of intellectual property. 60 Likewise, other trading arrangements, particularly some of the arrangements for trading blocs or free trade areas, have
followed some of the general outlines of the GATT dispute settlement
procedure, paying it the compliment of emulation.
The Uruguay Round Negotiation currently sponsored by the GATT (the
eighth since its origin) has been troubled. It was launched in September
1986, but is not yet complete. Nevertheless, in December 1991, the negotiating groups, through the coordination of the Secretariat and the DirectorGeneral, Arthur Dunkel, issued a tentative draft text of an entire package
of agreements which could form the basis of the final negotiations towards
a complete package to be approved. This is commonly called the "Dunkel

59. See supra note 1, and particularly JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 1.
60. See Symposium: Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223 (1989); Dunkel Draft, supra note 11, annex III at 57.
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Draft," and it contains two important institutional texts that relate to the
problems discussed above. First, there is a charter for a Multilateral Trade
Organization (MTO), which will provide some measure of improvement in
the basic institutional structure of the GATT. It will not change such things
as the structure of rule making, but it does provide, for the first time, a
definitive legal treaty text to establish the organization, and put it on a
sounder footing for future evolution. The existence of this text has been
criticized by some interests in various participating countries, including some
of the environmental interests. Some of this criticism is, I think, due to
misunderstanding of the specific draft charter provisions and their relation
to broader international law principles. Indeed, the draft charter is very
minimal, and in many ways will result in no differences in the normal work
of the organization, as compared to the existing organizational structure. 6'
Another important text in the Dunkel Draft is a draft agreement
concerning revised dispute settlement procedures in the GATT. It should
be noted that these dispute settlement procedures could exist independently
of an MTO, if an MTO failed to come into being. However, an MTO does
facilitate and help administer a broadened dispute settlement system that
would now apply, not only to trade in goods, but also to intellectual
property and trade in services. This procedure would provide a more
effective "umbrella" for a single dispute settlement procedure and avoid
some of the contentious problems of competing procedures that existed
after the various Tokyo Round texts came into force.
Of course, there are those who would prefer not to have a more
effective dispute settlement procedure, or for that matter, a more effective
organization. They see any such organization, or procedure at the international level as a threat to their ability to achieve the results which they wish
within a particular country. There is not much that can be said in response
to that desire. In the view of this author, such a desire is somewhat
irresponsible because the basic trends of world economic interaction, regardless of what happens in connection with new treaties, are such that
some kinds of international cooperation and coordination are essential to
avoid the rancorous and damaging disputes that are constantly arising
between nations. International cooperation also provides the measure of
predictability and stability that is essential for individual entrepreneurs and
firms to act effectively. Often the action desired is investment, which depends
on decisions that need a predictable rule system.
Several particular aspects of the legal effects of international actions
should be clarified because there have been statements by various interest
groups that suggest some misunderstanding about them. The first of these
is the question of the domestic law application of international decisions of
a GATT/MTO system. For the United States, it is very unlikely that any
international GATT/MTO decision as to new rules (such as a new treaty)
or a dispute settlement procedure result, would have direct application (self-

61. Dunkel Draft, supra note 11, at 92.
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executing effect) in United States law. Although some treaties can have selfexecuting effect in the United States, in recent years Congress has rather
consistently negated such effect by provisions in its legislation approving
the international trade treaties. 62 This result, incidentally, differs from
country to country.
Many other countries are in the same position as the United States,
such that the international treaty or international decisions will not automatically become part of their domestic law.63 Instead, there must be an
"act of transformation," which is some sort of domestic legal action that
would implement the international rules or decisions. In the United States
this could be an Act of Congress, or in cases where the power is delegated
to the President, an action by the President or his delegatees. If the domestic'
law institutions fail to enact the appropriate transformation, the United
States or other country may be placed in contravention of international
obligations. Such a situation, however, will not result in automatic domestic
law change. To some extent this provides a certain escape hatch from
inappropriate and overreaching international decisions. Needless to say this
is a matter of considerable discussion and literature. 64
A second potential misunderstanding of the legal situation relates to
the effect of the GATT dispute settlement panel decisions. Under the current
and proposed procedure, a "panel" will make its ruling in a report, and
this report must be approved by the GATT Council. Under the new proposed
procedures, this approval would be fairly automatic, subject to an appeal
to a higher tribunal. 65 The GATT panel report is not binding until it is
approved. After such approval, it is binding on the participant nations as
a matter of international law, even though it does not directly become
domestic law. In the case of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA),
and possibly some new FTA arrangements, there is one portion of the
dispute settlement procedures available that does provide for direct, or
nearly direct, application of the decisions of the tribunal. This is relatively
rare and quite novel. 66
Even "with respect to international law obligations, the general international law rule is that the doctrine of precedent, or "stare decisis," does

62. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 3(a), (f), 19 U.S.C. § 2119(a), (f) (1988); S.REP.
No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 36 (1979); JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO
ROUND, supra note 1, at 169-72; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 68, 75.

63. See generally John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A
Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 310-40 (1992). The United Kingdom and Canada are
generally considered "dualist" nations where treaties do not apply in domestic law, but must
be implemented through parliamentary or other governmental acts of transformation. R.
Higgins, United Kingdom, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES

IN

DOMESTIC LAW 123 (Francis G.

Jacobs & Shelley Roberts, eds., 1987).
64. See supra note 60.
65. Dunkel Draft, supra note 11, §§ S (Understanding on Rules and Procedures on
Dispute Settlement), T (Elements of an Integrated Dispute Settlement System).
66. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 293; H.R. Doc. No.
216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 512 (1988).
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not apply to rulings of international tribunals. Thus, the result of a panel
report as between countries A & B, for example, is not technically a rule
that obligates countries C & D, or even A & D. This leaves open the
possibility that through general international negotiating processes, or actions in a council of the GATT or MTO, the results of a panel report,
even when approved, could be modified when applied to future cases.
Nevertheless, it is true that panels do tend to follow prior panel decisions
as a matter of persuasiveness and logical consistent reasoning. In some
67
cases, however, the panels have expressly departed from prior panel reports.

What are the implications of all of this for environmental policy? First,
as is fairly frequently noted in the text discussion in prior sections, many
of the policy clashes that environmental policy has with trade policy point
towards institutional questions. This is most importantly the case for the
dispute settlement processes of the GATT. It is in those processes that some

of the interstitial decisions involving interpretation of current or future
GATT/MTO treaties will be fought out. One example of that was the tuna/
dolphin case, in which the panel itself noted that it would be inappropriate

for the panel to make the requested interpretation of the GATT general
exceptions of Article XX. It stated that such decisions should be made by

the negotiators or the appropriate GATT bodies as a matter of treaty law
alteration, rather than simply an interpretation of a panel. 68 In that sense,
the tuna/dolphin case was praiseworthy, and in a broader sense should be
praised even by the environmentalists who dislike the outcome. It suggests

a certain amount of "judicial restraint." A contrary approach, with the
panel seizing the issue and going forward with it, might in some future case
be severely contrary to the interests of environmental policy.

67. See Report of the GATT Panel, European Economic Community Restrictions on
Imports of Dessert Apples, para 12.1, GATT Doc. L/6491 (June 22, 1989), BISD 36th Supp.
93, 124. The Report states that "[t]he Panel ... did not feel it was legally bound by all the
details and legal reasoning of the 1980 Panel report." Id. This is generally consistent with
international law. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (4th
ed. 1990).
68. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 36, at para. 6.3, at 1623 reads:
The Panel further recalled its finding that the import restrictions examined in this
dispute, imposed to respond to differences in environmental regulation of producers,
could not be justified under the exceptions in Articles XX(b) or XX(g). These
exceptions did not specify criteria limiting the range of life or health protection
policies, or resource conservation policies, for the sake of which they could be
invoked. It seemed evident to the Panel that, if the CONTRACTING PARTIES
were to permit import restrictions in response to differences in environmental policies
under the General Agreement, they would need to impose limits on the range of
policy differences justifying such responses and to develop criteria so as to prevent
abuse. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES were to decide to permit trade measures
of this type in particular circumstances it would therefore be preferable for them to
do so not by interpreting Article XX, but by amending or supplementing the
provisions of the General Agreement or waiving obligations thereunder. Such an
approach would enable the CONTRACTING PARTIES to impose such limits and
develop such criteria.
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Nevertheless, the environmentalists, apart from the question of precedent, have several legitimate complaints about the GATT dispute settlement
procedures, among others. First, they note appropriately that the GATT
lacks a certain amount of transparency. By that, we can understand that
the GATT tends too often to try to operate in secrecy, attempting to avoid
public and news media accounts of its actions. In recent years, this has
become almost a charade, because many of the key documents, most
importantly the early results of a GATT dispute settlement panel report,
leak out almost immediately to the press. For purposes of gaining a broader
constituency among the various policy interested communities in the world,
gaining the trust of those constituencies, enhancing public understanding,
as well as avoiding the "charade" of ineffective attempts to maintain
secrecy, the GATT could go much further in providing "transparency" of'
its processes.
Secondly, there is criticism and concern that the GATT lacks the kind
of expertise that would help it to make better decisions in dispute settlement
processes. In particular, it is believed that the GATT lacks expertise in
environmental issues. Again, there is considerable room for improvement
in this regard, perhaps with procedures that would give panels certain
technical assistance.
Finally, there is criticism of the GATT panel processes in that they
(while operating in secret) fail to make provisions for the transmittal of
arguments, information, and evidence from a variety of interested groups
including nongovernment environmental policy groups. Once again, there
should be ways that the GATT can improve on this problem.
Apart from the dispute settlement procedures, the overall institutional
set up of a GATT and a possible MTO could be likewise improved. In
particular, transparency could be enhanced, perhaps by Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) as well as Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs)
gaining some share of participation in the GATT processes, possibly through
an annual open meeting. Furthermore, as the GATT or MTO continue to
evolve, procedures such as the already set up TPRM might build in provisions for explicit attention to environmental concerns. It is clear that some
of the GATT rules need to be changed. There are a variety of ways for
them to be changed, some discussion on which is provided in Annex B. 69
VIII.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

The discussions of this paper cover only the tip of the iceberg regarding
the problematic relationship between world trade system policies and environmental policies. But in the light of those discussions, what can we say
about the relationship of two policy sets? Are they congruent or conflicting?
The answer obviously is a bit of both.

69. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND GATT, supra note 1; John H. Jackson, Changing
GATT Rules (Nov. 7, 1991) (appended as Annex B).
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In the broader long term perspective there would seem to be a great
deal of congruence. Some of that congruence derives from the economic
and welfare enhancement of trade liberalization policies. Such welfare
enhancement can in turn lead to enhancement of environmental policy
objectives, as mentioned at the outset of this paper.
On the other hand, it isclear that the world trade policies and environmental policies do provide a certain amount of conflict. This conflict is
not substantially different from a number of other areas where governmental
policies have to accommodate conflicting aims ind goals of the policy
makers and their constituents. Thus, to some degree it is a question of
wheie the line will be drawn, or how the compromises will be made. In
that sense, institutions obviously become very important because the decision
making process can tilt the decision results. If the world trade rules are
pushed to their limit, for example, free trade with no exceptions for problems
raised by environmental policies and actions effecting environments, clearly
the trade rules will cause damage to environmental objectives. Likewise, if
the environmental policies are pushed to their limit at the expense of the
trading rules, so that governments will find it convenient and easy to set
up a variety of restrictive trade measures, in some cases under the excuse
of environmental policies, world trade will suffer.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that the "cultures" of the two policy
communities: that of trade, and that of environment, differ in important
ways. The trade policy experts have tended, over decades and perhaps
centuries, to operate more under the practices of international diplomacy,
which often means secrecy, negotiation, compromise, and to some extent
behind the scenes catering to a variety of special economic interests. In
addition, at the international level, because there is no over-arching "sovereign leader," the processes are slow, faltering, and lend themselves to
lowest common denominator results, or to diplomatic negotiations that
agree to language without real agreement on substance.
On the other hand, the environmental policy groups, perhaps partly
because they primarily operate on the national scene, have become used to
using the processes of publicity and lobbying pressure on Congress or
Parliaments, to which they have considerable access. There is, thus, a much
broader sense of "participation" in the processes, which the international
processes have not yet accommodated. Furthermore, the environmental
policy groups, like many other groups working on the domestic level, have
a sense of power achieved through successes in the legislative and public
discussion processes. They feel somewhat frustrated with the international
processes because those are sufficiently different to pose puzzling obstacles
to the achievement of environmental goals.
This difference in culture is not inevitably permanent, and indeed the
international processes need to accommodate more transparency and participation. This is true not only of the environmental case, but it'is increasingly
an important consideration for the broader way that international economic
interdependence is managed. As more and more decisions that effect firms,
citizens, and other groups, are made at the international level, it will be
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necessary for the international decision making process to accommodate the
goals of transparency, adequate expertise, and participation in the advocacy
and rule making procedures.
To some extent, the rhetoric of some environmental policy advocates
has been the rhetoric of antagonism to international organizations and
procedures altogether. This, I suggest, is not constructive. The notion that
the United States, for example, can, or should impose unilaterally its
environmental views and standards on other parts of the world, without
any constraint from international rules or international dispute settlement
procedures, is not likely to be a viable approach in the longer run. This
means that in some cases when the United States submits (as it must, prtly
so as to reciprocally get other countries to submit) to international dispute
settlement procedures, it will sometimes lose, and find itself obliged to alter
its own domestic policy preferences. This has already been the case, and
the United States has a mixed record of compliance with GATT
rulings,
70
although for a large powerful nation that record is not too bad.
Apart from these longer run and institutional issues, there are matters
that can be undertaken jointly by the trade and environmental policy
communities, in the context of the GATT/MTO system. By way of reviewing
some of the discussion in sections above, there seem to be two groups of
actions that would be called for, the near term, and the longer term.
Focusing first on the near term actions: it seems feasible for the
international trading system to accommodate some of the following actions
or goals:
1) Greater transparency both in the rule making and in the dispute
settlement procedures of the trading system. This would call for
more participation, greater opportunity for policy advocacy inputs,
and for more openness in terms of publication of the relevant
documents faster and in a way more accessible to interested parties;
2) Greater access to participation in the processes,
3) Some clarification is needed about the degree to which the
international process will be allowed to intrude upon the scope of
70. In a number of not too recent GATT panel cases that were brought by complaints
against the United States, and in which the panel ruled that the U.S. measures were inconsistent
with GATT, the United States subsequently revised its legislation or other measures in order
to comply with the GATT panel report. See, e.g., Report of the GATT Panel, United StatesCustoms User Fee, GATT Doc. L/6264 (Feb. 2, 1988), BISD 35th Supp. 245; United States
Manufacturing Clause, GATT Doc. L/5609 (May 5, 1984), BISD 31st Supp. 74; Report of
the GA 7T Panel, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, GATT
Doc. L/6175 (June 17, 1987), BISD 34th Supp. 136; Report of the GATT Panel, United
States-Tax Legislation (DISC), GATT Doc. L/4422 (Nov. 12, 1976), BISD 23rd Supp. 98.
On the other hand, the United States has not complied with several other panel reports. In
some cases the United States has announced that it will accept the panel report and ultimately
comply, but will wait until after the end of the Uruguay Round in case the Uruguay Round
modifies the rule. See, e.g., Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 24; Report of the Committee
on Anti-Dumping Practices, GATT Doc. L/6609, BISD 36th Supp. 435, 438 (addressing
complaint of Sweden).
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decision making of national and sub-national governments. For
example, the "scope of review" of international GATT/MTO panels
over national government regulatory decisions concerning environment needs to be better defined. This is not an easy question, and
it will not be solved quickly, but there probably needs to be some
near term accommodation through interpretive notes or otherwise
in the Dunkel Draft texts, for example. Some of the NAFTA text
approach can be an useful example; and
4) Finally, there will have to be some near-term rule accommodation by the GATT, by which I mean some adjustments or changes
in those rules through one or another of the techniques for changing
GATT rules (probably focusing on the waiver procedure) to establish
a reasonably clear set of exceptions for certain multilateral environmental treaty provisions that call for trade action that would otherwise be inconsistent with the GATT/MTO rules.
Looking at the longer term, it is clear that there is a substantial agenda
that must be addressed with regard to the intersection and potential clash
of trade policies and environmental policies. The GATT/MTO system must
develop mechanisms, including working parties and negotiations, to address
these, and they will take time. The long term agenda includes the following
actions and goals:
1) The subsidies area will need substantial study and some kind
of rule alteration to accommodate the respective interest;
2) Some type of more permanent exception will be needed either
as an amendment or waiver embellishment of the Article XX
exceptions of the GATT system, or possibly in the context of the
national treatment rules. This can build upon the short term rule
alterations (for example, by waiver) mentioned above, with particular reference to the process-product characteristic question, so as
to accommodate the broadly agreed international environmental
policy provisions, such as those now contained in some treaties;
3) Undoubtedly the GATT/MTO dispute settlement procedure will
continue to evolve, in the light of experience. Even if near term
provision is made for policy advocacy inputs from environmental
policy experts, as time goes on and experience is obtained, there
will need to be further adjustments in that procedure, possibly with
some added limitations on the scope of review of international
panels over domestic national environmental provisions; and
4) In particular, there needs to be some clarification about the
rules and exceptions to accommodate national government unilateral
imposition of environmentally justified rules that require or provide
incentive for a higher standard of environmental protection than
that for which the international community is able to develop a
consensus.
It would be tragic if increased antagonism between the two policy
groups occurred in such a way that the essential policy goals of both groups
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would be damaged unnecessarily. Hopefully, with some of the clarifications
of the policies outlined in this paper, combined with some of the institutional
measures suggested, such antagonism can be largely avoided, or creatively
channeled to promote a constructive accommodation of the discordant policy
objectives.
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ANNEX A: SELECTED PROVISIONS OF GATT
PART I
Article I

General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to
the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules
and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with
respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party
to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not require the
elimination of any preferences in respect of import duties or charges which
do not exceed the levels provided for in paragraph 4 of this Article and
which fall within the following descriptions:
(a) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more of the
territories listed in Annex A, subject to the conditions set forth
therein;
(b) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more territories
which on July 1, 1939, were connected by common sovereignty or
relations of protection or suzerainty and which are listed in Annexes
B, C and D, subject to the conditions set forth therein;
(c) Preferences in force exclusively between the United States of
America and the Republic of Cuba ;
(d) Preferences in force exclusively between neighbouring countries
listed in Annexes E and F.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to preferences between
the countries formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire and detached from it
on July 24, 1923, provided such preferences are approved under paragraph
5 of Article XXV, which shall be applied in this respect in the light of
paragraph 1 of Article XXIX.
4. The margin of preference* on any product in respect of which a
preference is permitted under paragraph 2 of this Article but is not specifically set forth as a maximum margin of preference in the appropriate
Schedule annexed to this Agreement shall not exceed:
(a) in respect of duties or charges on any product described in such
Schedule, the difference between the most-favoured-nation and pref-
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erential rates provided for therein; if no preferential rate is provided
for, the preferential rate shall for the purposes of this paragraph
be taken to be that in force on April 10, 1947, and, if no mostfavoured-nation rate is provided for, the margin shall not exceed
the difference between the most-favoured-nation and preferential
rates existing on April 10, 1947;
(b) in respect of duties or charges on any product not described in
the appropriate Schedule, the difference between the most-favourednation and preferential rates existing on April 10, 1947.
In the case of the contracting parties named in Annex G, the date of April
10, 1947, referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall
be replaced by the respective dates set forth in that Annex.
PART II
Article III*

National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied
to imported or*domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production.*
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover,
no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in paragraph 1.*
3. With respect to any existing internal tax which is inconsistent with
the provisions of paragraph 2, but which is specifically authorized under a
trade agreement, in force on April 10, 1947, in which the import duty on
the taxed product is bound against increase, the contracting party imposing
the tax shall be free to postpone the application of the provisions of
paragraph 2 to such tax until such time as it can obtain release from the
obligations of such trade agreement in order to permit the increase of such
duty to the extent necessary to compensate for the elimination of the
protective element of the tax.
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale,
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offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential
internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic
operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the
product.
5. No contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in
specified amounts or proportions which requires, directly or indirectly, that
any specified amount or proportion of any product which is the subject of
the regulation must be supplied from domestic sources. Moreover, no
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal quantitative regulations in
a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.*
6. The provisions of paragraph 5 shall not apply to any internal
quantitative regulation in force in the territory of any contracting party on
July 1, 1939, April 10, 1947, or March 24, 1948, at the option of that
contracting party; Provided that any such regulation which is contrary to
the provisions of paragraph 5 shall not be modified to the detriment of
imports and shall be treated as a customs duty for the purpose of negotiation.
7. No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing
or use of products in specified amounts or proportions shall be applied in
such a manner as to allocate any such amount or proportion among external
sources of supply.
8. (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations
or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies
of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a
view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production
of goods for commercial sale.
(b) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of
subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments to
domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or
charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and
subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic products.
9. The contracting parties recognize that internal maximum price control
measures, even though conforming to the other provisions of this Article,
can have effects prejudicial to the interests of contracting parties supplying
imported products. Accordingly, contracting parties applying such measures
shall take account of the interests of exporting contracting parties with a
view to avoiding to the fullest practicable extent such prejudicial effects.
10. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any contracting
party from establishing or maintaining internal quantitative regulations
relating to exposed cinematograph films and meeting the requirements of
Article IV.
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Article VI
Anti-dumping and CountervailingDuties
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products
of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less
than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or
threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a
contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic
industry. For the purposes of this Article, a product is to be considered as
being introduced into the commerce of an importing country at less than
its normal value, if the price of the product exported from one country to
another
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the
exporting country, or,
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export
to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of
origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit.
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and
terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting
price comparability.*
2. In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy
on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than
the margin of dumping in respect of such product. For the purposes of this
Article, the margin of dumping is the price difference determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.*
3. No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory
of any contracting party imported into the territory of another contracting
party in excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy
determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture,
production or export of such product in the country of origin or exportation,
including any special subsidy to the transportation of a particular product.
The term "countervailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special duty
levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly
or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise.*
4. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping
or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from
duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption
in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of the refund of such
duties or taxes.
5. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to both anti-
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dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of
dumping or export subsidization.
6. (a) No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or countervailing
duty on the importation of any product of the territory of another contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or
subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten material
injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially
the establishment of a domestic industry.
(b) The CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive the requirement of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph so as to permit a contracting party to levy
an anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the importation of any product
for the purpose of offsetting dumping or subsidization which causes or
threatens material injury to an industry in the territory of another contracting party exporting the product concerned to the territory of the importing
contracting party. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall waive the requirements of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to permit the levying
of a countervailing duty, in cases in which they find that a subsidy is
causing or threatening material injury to an industry in the territory of
another contracting party exporting the product concerned to the territory
of the importing contracting party.*
(c) In exceptional circumstances, however, where delay might cause
damage which would be difficult to repair, a contracting party may levy a
countervailing duty for the purpose referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of this
paragraph without the prior approval of the CONTRACTING PARTIES;
Provided that such action shall be reported immediately to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and that the countervailing duty shall be withdrawn promptly
if the CONTRACTING PARTIES disapprove.
7. A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or of the return
to domestic producers of a primary commodity, independently of the
movements of export prices, which results at times in the sale of the
commodity for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged
for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, shall be presumed
not to result in material injury within the meaning of paragraph 6 if it is
determined by consultation among the contracting parties substantially interested in the commodity concerned that:
(a) the system has also resulted in the sale of the commodity for
export at a price higher than the comparable price charged for the
like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, and
(b) the system is so operated, either because of the effective regulation of production, or otherwise, as not to stimulate exports
unduly or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of other contracting parties.
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Article XI*
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses
or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the
following:
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to
prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other
products essential to the exporting contracting party;
(b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to
the application of standards or regulations for the classification,
grading or marketing of commodities in international trade;
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product,
imported in any form,* necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate:
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product
permitted to be marketed or produced, or, if there is no
substantial domestic production of the like product, of
a domestic product for which the imported product can
be directly substituted; or
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic
product, or, if there is no substantial domestic production
of the like product, of a domestic product for which the
imported product can be directly substituted, by making
the surplus available to certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices below the current
market level; or
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced
of any animal product the production of which is directly
dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported commodity, if the domestic production of that commodity is
relatively negligible.
Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any
product pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public
notice of the total quantity or value of the product permitted to be imported
during a specified future period and of any change in such quantity or
value. Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not be such
as will reduce the total of imports relative to the total of domestic production, as compared with the proportion which might reasonably be expected
to rule between the two in the absence of restrictions. In determining this
proportion, the contracting party shall pay due regard to the proportion
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prevailing during a previous representative period and to any special factors*
which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product
concerned.
Article XVI*

Subsidies
Section A-Subsidies in General
1.. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including
any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly
to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any
product into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES
in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated
effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or
products imported into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is
determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting
party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting
party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other
contracting party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization.
Section B-Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies*
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting
party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects
for other contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may cause
undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder
the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of
subsidies on the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting
party grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to
increase the export of any primary product from its territory, such subsidy
shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party
having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product,
account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade
in the product during a previous representative period, and any special
factors which may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the
product.*

4. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date
thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly
any form of subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary
product which subsidy results in the sale of such product for export at a
price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers
in the domestic market. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting party shall
extend the scope of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January
1955 by the introduction of new, or the extension of existing, subsidies.*
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5. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the operation of the
provisions of this Article from time to time with a view to examining its
effectiveness, in the light of actual experience, in promoting the objectives
of this Agreement and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to the
trade or interests of contracting parties.
Article XX
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including
those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII,
the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the
prevention of deceptive practices;
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
(I) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic,
historic or archaeological value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption;
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agreement which conforms to criteria submitted
to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by them
or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved;*
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary
to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such
materials is held below the world price as part of a governmental
stabilization plan; Provided that such restrictions shall not operate
to increase the exports of or the protection afforded to such domestic
industry, and shall not depart from the provisions of this Agreement
relating to non-discrimination;
(1) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general
or local short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be
consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled
to an equitable share of the international supply of such products,
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and that any such measures, which are inconsistent with the other
provisions of this Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the
conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the need for this sub-paragraph
not later than 30 June 1960.
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ANNEX B: JOHN H. JACKSON MEMO,
"CHANGING GATT RULES"
(NOVEMBER 7, 1991)
The University of Michigan
Law School
MEMORANDUM

By: John H. Jackson
Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law
University of Michigan
School of Law
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
Tel: (313)764-2359
Tel: (313)764-8309
Re: Changing GATT Rules
Date: November 7, 1991
I, have been asked to review the various techniques by which governments
may be able to change GATT rules, perhaps to provide that these rules
better accommodate some of the important environmental concerns and
objectives of GATT Contracting Parties.
The following is a brief review of this subject. I have appended a list
of some of the published works by this author, which can be consulted for
greater detail.
I.

INTRODUCTION.

Despite some occasional misguided or misinformed statements to the
contrary, the GATT is a binding treaty obligation accepted by the nations
which are Contractirig Parties. Because of the odd beginnings of the GATT,
however, there is considerable confusion about this and other matters
concerning it. 71 The GATT was not originally intended to be an international
organization, nor to be the central international institution for facilitating
international trade. That role was to be for an ITO-International Trade
Organization, as embodied in the so-called Havana Charter of 1948 which
never came into force. Because it never came into force, the GATT has
had to fill that role. Because of the structure of the drafting of the GATT
agreement, the GATT treaty as such has never come into a force either,
but it is nevertheless applied by the 1947 Protocol of Provisional Application
(PPA), which is a binding treaty obligation. The practice of nations in
GATT since this treaty came into force on January 1, 1948, entirely confirms
the treaty nature. There is very little doubt expressed among the people
who have looked at this issue closely, that the GATT has this binding treaty
status.

71. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND GATT, supra note 1; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING

SYSTEM, supra note 1.
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However, because of this peculiar history of origin, the GATT has a
number of institutional weaknesses, what I have sometimes called "birth
defects." I will not elaborate on these, but reference can be made to some
of my other works where I have given this detail. 72 One example, has been
the difficulty of amending the GATT, and this has led to approaches other
'than amendments, such as the various separate treaty "side-codes" resulting
from the Tokyo Round. Furthermore, ambiguities in the GATT treaty
relating to institutional procedures such as powers of the contracting parties,
or voting, have provided a number of risks to the contracting parties, risks
that have been felt particularly important to large trading powers. Thus,
although the language in some cases might be deemed loose enough to
authorize certain kinds of procedural ways to change the GATT, the
contracting parties have been understandably and appropriately reluctant to
exercise these procedures to their fullest scope.
II.

Changing the GATT Rules.

The following is a quick summary outline of most of the various
possibilities:
1) Formal Amendments to the GATT Treaty.
Article XXX of the GATT provides for amendment. Of course, the
GATT is applied through the Protocol of Provisional Application, and one
must look first to that protocol, but the practice in GATT has been to
utilize the provisions of GATT as applied by the PPA, including Article
XXX regarding amendments. In technical legal terms, the Protocol of
Provisional Application applying the GATT is amended through the procedure of Article XXX, as incorporated in the PPA.
The provisions of Article XXX, however, are very stringent. This article
requires unanimous consent to amend certain portions of the GATT (particularly Articles I & II on MFN and tariff concessions), and two-thirds
approval to amend other provisions of the GATT. The practice has been
that approval must be thiough a treaty ratification process of a protocol
of amendment. Thus, many national governments find it necessary to submit
amendments to their parliaments. When the "membership" numbered in
the thirties, this procedure of amendment was more feasible. However, a
unanimous amendment has never succeeded. As the membership has enlarged, and now exceeds 100, it appears to be increasingly difficult to fulfill
the amending requirements. The Council of GATT was set up in the late
1950's by resolution of the Contracting Parties (there is no provision in the
treaty for such a body), and the Council was formulated to be open to any
Contracting Party which is interested. Yet, only about two-thirds of the
GATT Contracting Parties have established membership in the Council as

72. See JACKSON,
GATT, supra note I.

WORLD TRADE AND

GATT, supra note I;

JACKSON,

RESTRUCTURING
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"interested." This can possibly be a signal of relative lack of interest- of
the other one-third, which could make it very difficult to achieve a two-thirds vote, especially if among the two-thirds "interested" parties there
were even a small number who oppose an amendment.
Even if an amendment procedure succeeds, GATT Article XXX provides
that those countries that do not accept the amendment are not bound by
it. Thus, even an amendment has a certain "GATT ;h la carte" characteristic,
with.some countries bound and others not. In the Uruguay Round, there
is some discussion of a fairly radical new technique for changing the GATT,
by substituting a whole new treaty. I will refer to this below.
2) Waivers.
Article XXV paragraph 5 of GATT, provides that the Contracting
Parties can adopt a "waiver" of the GATT, in circumstances not otherwise
provided for, by two-thirds of votes cast (which must include at least a
majority of the total membership). Waivers have been used for a variety
of circumstances in GATT, including even waivers from Article I & II (thus
somewhat undermining the amending unanimity iequirement). Some waivers
have been open ended without a termination date, and there is considerable
discussion about a) whether that is appropriate; and b) whether even such
waivers can be terminated by later vote of the Contracting Parties. Nevertheless, a waiver can be a very important and flexible means of changing
GATT rules, at least for a temporary period of time. For example, a five
year waiver could be. adopted by the Contracting Parties that would specifically refer to certain listed multilateral environmental agreement (such as
the Montreal Protocol) and provide that actions under them would not be
deemed inconsistent with other GATT rules.
3) Decisions of Article XXV_
The language of Article XXV provides that the Contracting Parties
acting jointly can "meet from time to time for the purpose of giving effect
to those provisions of this agreement which involve joint action and,
generally, with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the
objectives of this agreement." Article XXV provides for one nation, one
vote, and unless otherwise specified, actions by a majority of the votes cast.
This is extraordinarily broad and flexible language, and thus could be
subject to abuse. A large number of small countries could theoretically
adopt new binding rules in the GATT to achieve an advantage for themselves
at the expense of a minority of even very large and powerful trading
countries, although such rules would not likely be followed. However,
during the history of GATT it appears that there has never been a Contracting Party vote that imposed a new obligation on GATT Contracting
Parties (except sometimes as a condition, or prerequisite to a waiver opportunity).
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4)

Interpretations of the GATT Agreement.

The language of GATT Article XXV is broad enough to conclude that
the Contracting Parties have the power to definitively interpret the GATT
provisions. By definitive interpretation, I mean an interpretation which
would be binding as a matter of treaty law on all parties to the agreement
including those which oppose the interpretation. Such is explicitly provided
for in the charters of a number of other organizations including the IMF
and the World Bank. There is no such explicit provision in GATT, and
thus it could be contrarily argued that the intent of the draftsman was to
exclude this power. However, the language of Article XXV is so broad,
and there have been a number of instances of GATT practice consistent
with the notion of GATT Contracting Party interpretations of the agreement, that in my judgment it can be successfully argued that Contracting
Parties have this power of interpretation.
However, this raises a number of additional legal issues. An important
first consideration is how to draw the line between an "interpretation,"
and a "new rule, or new obligation." There is no easy way, except in
general an interpretation implies that the structure of the existing language
reasonably permits a legal body, or tribunal to conclude that that language
shall have the implications decided by the "interpretation." In instances of
interpretation practice of the GATT, this has been the case.
Under general international law regarding treaties, as expressed, inter
alia, in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the practice of an
international organization's bodies and organs over a period of time, is an
important source of interpreting the charter, at least when that practice
implies the agreement of the parties in the organization. Thus, the practice
of GATT, including practice which interprets the provisions of GATT
(whether by chairman's rulings, formal resolutions, waivers, etc.) all becomes
part of the source material on which to base interpretations.
5)

Dispute Settlement Panel Interpretations.

In the light of the previous section, dispute settlement panel reports
which almost always include interpretations of the GATT rules become an
important element of GATT practice. This is also the case for various
dispute settlement bodies of the other related GATT treaties or side codes.
In fact there are several different ways to interpret the impact of a
GATT dispute panel report. The practice of GATT, is that these reports
must be approved by the Council. Thus, it can be successfully argued that
without approval, the panel reports do not have any legal binding status
(but they may still be persuasive as the opinion of important experts.)
Assuming that a panel report is adopted by the Council, however, there
is still considerable ambiguity about its impact. There are at least two
possibilities for that impact: 1) That the adoption by the Council is an
exercise of the Contracting Parties authority under Article XXV to issue a
definitive interpretation of the GATT binding on all; or 2) a decision by
the Contracting Parties to adopt the panel report is a statement of how the
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particular dispute between the disputing parties involved in the case shall
be resolved, thus imposing a binding international law obligation on those
disputing parties (and only those disputing parties), to carry out the recommendation, decisions, or implications of the panel report.
It seems reasonably clear to me that the general practice of GATT
supports the second but not the first interpretation. Indeed, arguably if the
first were intended, a formal vote (at least a mail or telegraph ballot) should
be taken of the Contracting Parties, and actibn should not merely be by
Council decision. Furthermore, if one were to ask delegates at a Council
meeting which adopted a panel report, if they intended that to be definitive
in the broader binding sense, I feel secure in saying that most would indicate
they had not thought of that question, but did not intend such an important
impact.
If the second interpretation is the correct one about the, result of an
adopted GATT panel report, then we must understand that under international law there is no formal doctrine of "stare decisis" or precedent. Thus,
the panel report legally binds only the disputants in the particular case, and
even then only for that case (not even for a future case between the same
disputants). This is the impact of explicit provisions in the statute governing
the world court (the International Court of Justice, statute Article 59),
which is also generally deemed to be the rule in international law (and
indeed in most legal systems of the world, excepting the common law
systems such as the UK and the United States). Nevertheless, such a GATT
panel report is now "practice" of the organization, and becomes part of
the source materials for interpreting the agreement. Furthermore, the panels
themselves often use "precedent," by referring to prior panel reports, and
certainly after a period of time, panel reports are relied and acted upon in
a way that reinforces their impact as definitive interpretations through
practice. Nevertheless, it must be understood, that the Contracting Parties
(and thus the Council) do have the authority to depart from prior .panel
reports, and indeed subsequent panels themselves have departed from the
conclusions of prior panel reports.
Of course, again, a panel's work engages the issue of when is a
recommendation/decision an "interpretation," or really an exercise in "law
making," of new rules. This issue is always involved in legal systems, and
is certainly prominent among those debated in the context of national courts
such as the U.S. Supreme Court. At the international level, there are
likewise similar issues, and one can find in GATT panel reports languagewhich is criticized because of the alleged overreach of a panel, encroaching
upon the authority of the nation-state contracting parties to negotiate new
rules.
6) Separate Treaties.
Another way to effectively change the significance and impact of GATT
rules, is for those countries that are willing to undertake such change to
enter into a separate treaty agreement embodying that change. This was the
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technique heavily used in the Tokyo Round Negotiation, developing a series
of side "stand alone" treaties, sometimes called codes (such as those for
customs valuation, antidumping, subsidies, government procurement, product standards, aircraft, etc.). This can be an effective legal device, particularly if such a treaty agreement is accepted by a large number of Contracting
Parties, representing a very large proportion of world trade. Such treaties,
of course, only bind those that accept it, so that those that refuse to accept
it can argue that they are entitled to continue to rely upon the GATT
agreement. Since the GATT agreement includes MFN-Most Favored Nation, some of those hold-out countries can argue they are entitled to the
benefits of a side agreement even though they do not accept the side
agreement, or its obligations. This has been an important limitationsometimes termed the "free rider" or "foot dragger" problem of MFN. In
the GATT, among the Tokyo Round codes, the one most widely accepted
is that of product standards, and the number of countries which have
accepted that is only about 40. Because this approach fragmented the rules
system, it is termed "GATT A la carte" and has been heavily criticized,
particularly in the context of Uruguay Round plans.
Treaties can have an impact on GATT, even though they are not
negotiated or concluded in the GATT context. For example, if a number
of GATT Contracting Parties in a totally different context (such as a
multilateral environmental conference) enter into a treaty, that latter treaty
will prevail in the event of conflict with GATT, as to the Contracting
Parties which have accepted the latter treaty. Thus, for example, the
Montreal Protocol dealing with CFC's, would be deemed to prevail as
among those countries which have accepted it, even if inconsistent with
GATT provisions. However, once again, it would not be deemed as a matter
of law to prevail over the GATT obligations owed to GATT Contracting
Parties which have not accepted the later treaty, or Montreal Protocol.
Sometimes, a sufficiently large number of important trading countries have
accepted a later treaty such that those members have felt that the risk of
complaint by GATT Contracting Parties who have not accepted the later
treaty making is minimal. This is legally a bit messy, but may be pragmatically acceptable.
7)

Replacement Treaty Concepts and the Uruguay Round.

An additional way to change GATT rules, probably only available in
the context of a very broad based reform or negotiation, such as the result
of a major trading round, is in effect to replace the GATT with a totally
new GATT agreement. Under the Protocol of Provisional Application of
GATT, countries can withdraw from the protocol and GATT by only sixty
days notice. It is possibly that a large number of GATT Contracting Parties,
embodying an overwhelmingly large part of world trade, could come to a
new GATT agreement, and agree to offer the benefits of the new agreement
only to those countries which accept it. At the same time (or after a delay)
these countries would exercise their right to terminate their obligations in
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the old GATT. If the numbers of new GATT followers were sufficiently
large, this could effectively establish a new GATT, and put such heavy
pressure on the hold out countries that they would deem it virtually essential
to go along with the new GATT, thus abandoning the old GATT entirely.
This is not an approach to be lightly or repeatedly undertaken. It is
probably available only in major reform circumstances, such as embodying
the results of the end of the Uruguay Round. It would not be useful for
time to time adjustments in the rules to keep abreast of rapidly changing
international trade circumstances. It is also likely not to be available at this
stage of the Uruguay Round for rather new subjects that could be acrimoniously controversial and thus a threat to the success of the Round as a
whole.
III.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To summarize, there are a number of different ways to effectively
change the GATT rules. It is likely that the most flexible for time limited
and short term changes may be the "waiver" at least when the result is
not to impose a new obligation on GATT Contracting Parties. But overall,
the institutional defects and ambiguities of the GATT legal structure, while
apparently providing a number of different options for changing the GATT
rules, do not easily accommodate permanent change of a nature requiring
new affirmative obligations. To slide by the legal requirements of GATT,
or to rely on ambiguous clauses such as those of Article XXV, can raise
considerable risks at least for major trading countries. These risks arise
from the vulnerability to a one-nation, one-vote system in the context of
more than 100 nation participants. It is thus likely that the United States,
Europe, and Japan among others, would be reluctant to endorse a procedure
that would provide a precedent for such future risks.
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ANNEX C: SELECTED TEXT FROM
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(October 7, 1992)
104: RELATION TO ENVIROItMENTAL AND CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS
1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the
specific trade obligations set out in:

ARTICLE

(a) the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at Washington, March 3,
1973, as amended June 22, 1979;
(b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, done at Montreal, September 16, 1987, as amended June
29, 1990;
(c) the Basel Convention on the Control of TransboundaryMovements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, done at Basel,
March 22, 1989, upon its entry into force for Canada, Mexico and
the Untied States; or
(d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1,
such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, provided
that where a Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably "
available means of complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the
alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of this
Agreement.
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ANNEX 104.1
BILATERAL AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL AND CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS
1. The Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Untied States of America Concerning the Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Waste, signed at Ottawa, October 28, 1986.
2. The Agreement Between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States on Cooperationfor the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area, signed at La Paz, Baja California Sur,
August 14, 1983.
ARTICLE 903:AFFIRMATION OF AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE
AND OTHER AGREEMENTS
Further to Article 103 (Relaion to Other Agreements), the Parties
affirm with respect to each other their existing rights and obligations relating
to standards-related measures under the GATT Agreement on Technical
Barriersto Trade and all other international agreements, including environmental and conservation agreements, to which those Parties are party.
ARTICLE 904:BAsic RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS Non-Discriminatory Treatment
3. Each party shall, in respect of its standrads-related measures, accord
to goods and service providers of another Party:
(a)national treatment in accordance with Article 301 (Market Access) or
Article 1202 (Cross-Border Trade in Services); and
(b)treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like goods, or in like
circumstances to service providers, or any other country..
ARTICLE
905:USE OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
3. Nothing
in paragraph 1 shall be construed to prevent a
Party, in
pursuing its legitimate objectives, from adopting, maintaining or applying
any standards-related measure that results in a higher level of protection
than would be achieved if the measure were based on the relevant international standard.
ARTICLE 907:AssEssMENT OF RISK
1. A Party may, in pursuing its legitimate objectives, conduct an
assessment of risk. In conducting such assessment, a Party may take into
account, among other factors relating to a good or service:
(a) available scientific evidence or technical information;
(b) intended end uses ;
(c) processes or production, operating, inspection, sampling or
testing methods; or
(d) environmental conditions.
2. Where pursuant to Article 904(2) a Party establishes the level of
protection that it considers appropriate and conducts an assessment of risk,
it should avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions between similar goods
or services in the level of protection it considers appropriate, where the
distinctions:
(a) result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against goods
or service providers of another Party;
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(b) constitute a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties;
or
(c) discriminate between similar goods or services for the same use
under the same conditions that pose the same level of risk and
provide similar benefits.
3. Where a Party conducting an assessment of risk determines that
available scientific evidence or other information is insufficient to complte
the assessment, it may adopt a provisional technical regulation on the basis
of available relevant information. The Party shall, within a reasonable
period after information sufficient to complete the assessment of risk is
presented to it, complete its assessment, review and, where appropriate,
revise the provisional technical regulation in the light of that assessment.

